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ABSTRACT
Is the European Union a technocracy? Observers and practitioners of EU politics
have debated this deceptively simple question for decades, without arriving at a
clear answer. To a large extent, this is due to the elusive nature of technocracy
itself, a phenomenon that is hard to define with precision, and even harder to
measure empirically. To tackle this problem, the article presents a novel
approach to technocracy in the EU based on the study of bargaining settings,
in which political and technical actors interact horizontally and simultaneously
—as opposed to sequentially—thus allowing for a better appraisal of the
power of experts. Using data gathered by the ‘EMU Choices’ project, we apply
this alternative framework to the analysis of negotiations on the reform of the
Economic and Monetary Union over the period 2010–15, focusing on the role
of two institutional actors: the European Central Bank and the European
Commission. While we find some evidence for technocracy in EMU
negotiations, this has been mostly at the hands of the hybrid Commission
rather than the quintessentially technical ECB. This suggests both caution in
dismissing the EU as hopelessly technocratic, and the need for further
research on the nature of the Commission.
KEYWORDS Economic and Monetary Union; euro crisis; European Central Bank; European Commission;
technocracy
Introduction
Is the European Union (EU) a technocracy? This longstanding question about
the process of European integration (e.g., Radaelli, 1999; Shapiro, 2005;
Wallace & Smith, 1995) has become particularly pressing in the past decade
or so, as the euro crisis and the increasing politicization of European affairs
have made the (possibly disproportionate) place of unelected experts and
bureaucrats in the EU’s political system more salient than ever. Yet, we do
not now seem to be any closer to a clear answer to the matter than at any
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point during the past. For some, the EU can be described essentially in tech-
nocratic terms. The European Union, Matthijs and Blyth (2017) argue, ‘is a
technocracy, run by bureaucrats who see rule-breaking as a challenge to
their own authority. In particular, the “euro zone” – the countries of Europe
that share a single currency – is subjected to technocratic rule.’ In a similar
vein, Mounk (2018) presents the EU as a prime example of ‘undemocratic lib-
eralism’, a political regime that puts key aspects of decision-making in the
hands of career officials and specialized agencies disconnected from national
electorates. Other observers counter that the technocratic nature of the EU is
just another myth surrounding European affairs (e.g., Balfour & David-Wilp,
2016). The role performed by experts within the Union, they continue, is
not too different from what we would expect in any well-functioning
modern liberal democracy, namely very important yet confined within clear
boundaries set by representative politics. In sum, the EU may have many pro-
blems, but being a technocracy is not one of them (Schneider, 2018).
That diametrically opposite diagnoses coexist on such a crucial issue for the
political legitimacy of the EU is due to a number of reasons, including the fact
that observers on both sides often generalise—not least for rhetorical effect—
based on the observation of different parts, aspects, policies, or developmen-
tal stages of the Union. To a significant extent, however, the disagreement
runs much deeper than that, and relates to the elusiveness of technocracy
as a term, both conceptually and empirically (Radaelli, 1999; Sánchez-
Cuenca, 2017; Tortola, 2020a). For instance, where do we draw the exact
line between expert advice for, and undue influence over, political decisions?
At what point does the autonomy granted to technicians to implement
certain policies becomes too much? And how do we detect technocratic over-
stepping with precision in the context of wide political mandates? Questions
of this sort are often very difficult, if not impossible, to answer. As a result, the
concept of technocracy remains largely contested, and its occurrence in the
eye of the beholder.
This article aims to move the debate on EU technocracy beyond this con-
ceptual impasse by proposing a novel approach to the phenomenon, which
examines the power of experts by looking at their interactions with political
actors in bargaining settings, as opposed to the sequential relationship that
normally makes up the public policy process. To do so we leverage evidence
from the recent reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a process
that has developed over several years (and is, partly, still ongoing), involving a
dense set of negotiations between political and technical actors. The article
therefore contributes to the literature on EU technocracy from a conceptual,
theoretical and empirical standpoint.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: the next section elaborates on
the theoretical setup by further discussing the notion of technocracy, its con-
ceptual and empirical limits, and the solution presented by the analysis of
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bargaining settings. In the third section we then introduce the case of EMU
reform negotiations, and formulate four hypotheses on the occurrence of
and factors leading to technocracy in that specific context. The fourth
section describes our data and research design, and presents the empirical
analysis. The fifth and final section concludes by discussing our findings
and their implications, and sketching avenues for further research.
Technocracy and bargaining
Technocracy is a concept as complex and multifaceted as it is longstanding in
political and academic debates. Here we define technocracy as a state of
undue dominance by unelected experts over representative politicians in the
making of public policy. Our definition largely overlaps with the idea of ‘tech-
nocracy as regime’ in Tortola’s (2020a) recent dissection of the term, which
indicates a degeneration of the role of experts in the political system that
turns them into the de facto primary decision-makers, albeit within the
formal framework of representative democracy. This notion of technocracy
by no means exhausts the concept (Gunnell, 1982; Radaelli, 1999), but it is cer-
tainly the prevailing one (at least implicitly) in debates over the technocratic
nature of the European Union. Below we elaborate further on this definition.
All advanced political systems, including the EU, find it helpful to remove
some parts of the policy-making process from the direct control of the repre-
sentative political level, and place it in the hands of experts and technicians.1
This may happen for a number of reasons, such as the need to make well-
informed and effective choices in complex policy areas, or the desire to insu-
late certain decisions from the short-termist temptations of elected politicians
(Pettit, 2004; Tarlea, 2018; Tarlea & Freyberg-Inan, 2018; Vibert, 2007). What-
ever the rationale for delegating, in a well-functioning democratic system
the role of experts must always remain in a midway position between zero
and total autonomy vis-à-vis the political sphere. On the one hand, experts
must be granted a certain degree of freedom to be able to act on the basis
of science and knowledge rather than partisan-political logics. On the other
hand, their actions must be confined within broader societal objectives,
which by their intrinsic normative nature can only be set politically (Tortola,
2020a). To phrase it like Sartori (1987, p. 423), ‘[a] government of experts is
admissible in regard to means, not ends’.
It is the collapse of the latter boundary between politics and expertise that
gives rise to technocracy as defined here. As the technician escapes the
confines set by politics, s/he immediately turns into a technocrat controlling,
whether or not deliberately, not only the means of public policy, but also its
goals. Technocracy so defined is, therefore, an inherently undemocratic state
of affairs, which leaves the formal features of democracy—and above all the
subordination of technicians to politics—unaltered, but de facto shifts
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ultimate control over the definition of the ‘good society’ away from the demos
(via its elected representatives) and places it in the hands of a small group of
experts participating in policy-making in various capacities and at various
stages.
How does this stealthy usurpation of political power on the part of tech-
nicians take place? Technocracy scholar Jean Meynaud (1969) identifies four
modes of ‘dispossession’: first, and most simply, technicians may just disobey
or resist political instructions. Second, they may gain control of policy areas in
which they are given overly ample or vaguemandates, which leave them ‘prac-
tically master[s] of the problem’ (Meynaud, 1969, p. 80). Third, when advising
politicians and majoritarian institutions, experts can acquire sway by framing
and setting the terms of policy problems consistently with their preferred out-
comes. Finally, experts’ power can come from coordinating and mediating
among other governmental departments, particularly when inter-agency com-
promises are hard-won and unlikely to be questioned by politicians.
What these four avenues to technocracy have in common is that they all
refer to a sequential relationship between experts and politicians, in which
the former intervene in the policy-making process either before a political
decision is made, as consultants and advisors, or after it, as policy implemen-
ters. This is not too surprising, given that this sequential relationship is the
most common situation in democratic political systems. The problem this
sequential configuration poses, however, is that it often makes it very
difficult to identify precisely the point at which politics ends and expertise
begins (or vice versa), and consequently assess whether this line has actually
been trespassed by technicians—so giving rise to technocracy.2 This is, we
contend, a key (if not the main) reason behind the elusive and contested
nature of technocracy as a political phenomenon in virtually all advanced
democratic systems (Laird, 1990; Winner, 1978).
An important exception to the conceptual and empirical limits just
described is constituted by situations in which political and technical actors
do not work in sequence, but instead come together in order to make a
public policy decision. To the extent that non-trivial differences exist among
the preferences of politicians and experts, this generates a bargaining
setting that should make it easier to gauge the latter’s power—and therefore
technocracy—by measuring the bargaining outcome against the participants’
initial position: the closer the final decision to the technicians’ preferences
(and the farther from politicians’ positions), the stronger the case for the pres-
ence of technocracy.
By allowing a clearer and more precise assessment of expert influence in
policy-making, looking at the horizontal and simultaneous setup of bargain-
ing situations presents two further analytical advantages: first, it replaces
the common, and very simplistic dichotomous interpretation of technocracy
—whereby the technocratic nature of a political (sub)system is either
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accepted or rejected in toto—with a more fine-grained view of technocracy as
something that can occur to different degrees. As we noted in the introduc-
tion, the existing debate on technocracy is often forced into improbable gen-
eralizations by the vagueness of the term. By reducing the latter, we should
also be able to arrive at a more realistic measurement of technocracy.
Second, this approach puts us in a better position to move beyond a descrip-
tive analysis of technocracy, by examining the factors and contexts that cor-
relate with this phenomenon. In sum, the method proposed here should help
us improve on the existing debate on technocracy from a conceptual, theor-
etical, and empirical standpoint. The rest of the article applies the bargaining
approach to technocracy to the recent case of negotiations on the reform of
the Economic and Monetary Union.
Studying technocracy in EMU negotiations
The euro crisis has spurred an intense period of policy and reform activity
within the Eurozone, and the EU as a whole, over the past decade or so.
Faced with a wide array of new political and economic challenges, the EU
and Eurozone have had to make a number of important and unprecedented
policy decisions (such as on bailing out Greece and other ailing economies),
take initiatives for the update of existing institutions and procedures (e.g.,
those of the Stability and Growth Pact), and finally create new ones, such as
the Fiscal Compact, the Banking Union, and the European Stability Mechan-
ism.3 The many measures taken to reform the Economic and Monetary
Union in recent years have followed different timelines and been embedded
in a number of procedural frameworks (ranging from the community method
to traditional intergovernmental diplomacy), but they all have involved nego-
tiations among a variety of actors, both political and technical. Member state
governments make up most of the former category, while in the latter we find
primarily two supranational EU institutions:
1) European Central Bank (ECB). One of the foremost institutions of the Euro-
zone, the ECB is formally set up as an expert/technical actor par excellence:
it is an unelected, non-majoritarian body granted a high degree of inde-
pendence from its political principals (the member states), and tasked
with conducting the Eurozone’s monetary policy guided by macroeco-
nomic reasoning and within a mandate of price stability. In recent years,
the ECB has played an important role in steering the Eurozone through
its crisis and its economic aftermath, among other things by introducing
a number of unconventional measures, which have led many observers
to speak of a ‘politicization’ of the Bank (on this debate see e.g., Högenauer
& Howarth, 2016; Jones & Matthijs, 2019; Scicluna, 2014; Tortola, 2020b).
The excessive policy-making autonomy on the part of the ECB, to which
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 5
these authors point by using the term politicization, essentially overlaps
with the notion of technocracy as defined in this article.
2) European Commission (EC). The EC was originally established as a largely
technical body put in charge of the guardianship and implementation of
the European treaties. From its inception, however, the Commission was
also conferred a number of more political competences and traits,
among which its monopoly over supranational legislative initiatives and
its generalist, rather than specialist, policy portfolio. As Coombes (1970,
p. 83) put it in his classic study, this variety of roles and competences
made the Commission operate under ‘different kinds of attitude’—some
technical, some political—right from the start. The hybrid nature of the
EC has persisted, and arguably even become more marked, over time.
The introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten procedure for the appointment
of the EC president, and of public rituals such as the State of the European
Union address, for instance, have enhanced the political profile of the
Commission (Kassim & Laffan, 2019; Peterson, 2017; Wille, 2013). On the
other hand, the EC and its members still retain a wide range of more dis-
tinctly technical roles and competences, and have seen some of these sig-
nificantly strengthened in recent years—leading some observers to dub
the Commission ‘the most powerful “independent agency” in the world’
(Mounk, 2018, p. 102). This is the case, most notably, of macroeconomic
surveillance, where the EC holds a number of key functions (for example
through its role in the European Semester). The persistence of a strong
technical component in the mission of the EC motivates its inclusion in
this analysis.
Here we want to focus on the role and influence of these two institutions in
the negotiations for the reform of the EMU in order to assess the presence,
degree, and possibly correlates of technocracy in this sphere. While it does
not exhaust the recent activities of the EU (or even the Eurozone), the EMU
reform case is nonetheless a very good testing ground for technocracy for
at least three reasons: first, as already mentioned, because of the high inci-
dence of technical-political negotiations in this area, and the plenitude of
information and data that can be obtained on them. Second, because of
the importance of the recent EMU reforms as a juncture in the political and
institutional development of the Eurozone and the EU more generally,
which makes any question about the ways in which these decisions came
about, and about their legitimacy, especially salient. The third reason is that
the Eurozone is time and again depicted as the single most technocratic
arena in the EU, as noted at the beginning of this article. This, in a sense,
makes the EMU a ‘crucial’ case for studying technocracy in the EU: one in
which we would expect to see experts be particularly influential over policy
if the Union is indeed a technocratic system, and conversely one which
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should make us more sceptical vis-à-vis the notion of a technocratic EU,
should we not observe too much expert power in this specific set of nego-
tiations (Eckstein, 1975; Gerring, 2007). In sum, looking at the power of
experts in the process of EMU reform can provide us with a particularly impor-
tant piece in the broader puzzle of technocracy in the European Union.
We want to test, in particular, four distinct hypotheses on the presence of
and factors related to the power of the ECB and EC (hereafter ‘technical
actors’) in EMU reform negotiations:
H1: The technical actors systematically exert influence over the negotiations under
examination.
This first hypothesis is aimed at testing for the presence and extent of technoc-
racy tout court in EMU negotiations. In a technocratic situation we would expect
the two technical actors to systematically prevail in negotiations, or in any case
significantly pull the final outcome towards their initial bargaining position. Con-
versely, in a non-technocratic situation we would either see the technical actors
systematically on the losing side of negotiations, or detect no particular
influence pattern if technicians may win or lose with an equal probability.
H2: The technical actors will exert greater influence in negotiating settings that
place them in a more advantageous position.
As mentioned above, the EMU negotiations under scrutiny here have taken
place in a variety of formal settings. Regardless of the technical actors’ overall
bargaining power, we would expect them to be more influential whenever
the formal context and rules of the negotiation are more advantageous to
them. Two aspects seem particularly important in this respect: first, how close
the interaction between technical and political actors is—we would expect tech-
nicians to be more influential the more direct contact they have with the politi-
cal actors during the negotiating process (as opposed to negotiating from a
distance, so to speak). The second aspect is the bargaining and decision-
making rules: the more favourable they are to the technical actors, the greater
should be their influence.
H3: The technical actors will exert greater influence the more complex the issue
being negotiated.
The various issues negotiated as part of the EMU reform present different
degrees of complexity, defined here as the amount of background knowledge
and reasoning needed to formulate a well-informed opinion on a certain
matter. We expect the technical actors to be better equipped, on average,
to know and understand the ins and outs and the implications of the
issues under negotiation. This should give them an informational and argu-
mentative advantage that grows together with the complexity of the issue
under examination, and which should accordingly translate into greater bar-
gaining power.
H4: The technical actors will exert less influence the more politically salient the issue
under negotiation.
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Political salience—the awareness of a certain issue on the part of voters, and the
importance they attach to it—can be expected to diminish the power of experts
over the negotiation. As issues becomemore important in the eyes of the public,
political actors, whose fortunes depend more directly on voters’ support, will
have an incentive to harden their bargaining stance. Other things being
equal, this should in turn increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis unelected
technicians.
Data and research design
To test the four hypotheses just described, we rely primarily on data on
EMU reform generated by the ‘EMU Choices’ research project (www.
emuchoices.eu), which collected and coded information on the prefer-
ences of member states and supranational actors in negotiations on a
total of 47 distinct policy issues, spanning the period 2010–15 (Tarlea
et al., 2019; Wasserfallen et al., 2019). Here we will limit the analysis to
the 39 issues for which a negotiated outcome was reached by the end
of 2015. A description of the issues under examination is presented in
online appendix A.
The contestation space for each negotiated issue was coded on a 0–
100 scale, with the two extreme values indicating the highest level of dis-
agreement measured among negotiating actors. This coding scale was
designed in accordance with established practices, as introduced in
Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman (1994), and further developed by the
DEU I and II datasets (Thomson et al., 2012). For each of our issues, the
value 0 indicates positions in favor of measures that would eventually
lead to less European integration, whereas 100 indicates positions in
favor of policy changes leading to more European integration (see also
Lundgren et al., 2019a; Tarlea et al., 2019; Tarlea & Bailer, 2020). For
more detailed information on the coding procedure, its sources, and the
reliability of the data we direct the reader to online appendix B, as well
as Wasserfallen et al. (2019).
Two examples will briefly illustrate the coding scheme: in 2012 EU
members debated whether to expand the so-called fiscal compact to
include some form of tax coordination (issue FC8 in online appendix A).
Some governments were open to a number of options in this direction,
such as a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB), general tax har-
monization, or the introduction of a financial transaction tax (FTT). The nego-
tiating position of these member states was coded 100 in the dataset. A
majority of member states, however, held the opposite position (coded 0)
of rejecting any supranational form of tax coordination. As a result, the
fiscal compact remained focused on fiscal stability and budgetary discipline,
and the negotiation outcome was accordingly coded 0.
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The second illustrative case refers to the debates on the first Greek
bailout in early 2010 (issue G1 in online appendix A). As the EU and Euro-
zone searched for solutions to the Greek debt crisis, some member states
were prepared to support Greece financially (coded 100), while others
initially resisted such proposals (coded 0). On March 15, 2010 the Euro-
group agreed to make financial support available upon request (Greece
officially requested it on May 2, 2010). The decision to grant a bailout
funded by all Eurozone countries was coded 100. As the opinion started
to gravitate towards some form of the EU/Eurozone support, the debate
turned towards the question of the bailout’s precise structure (issue G2
in online appendix A). Some governments, together with the EC, initially
argued in favor of basing the programme on some systemic crisis-manage-
ment framework (such as a European Monetary Fund) (coded 100), while
others leaned towards an ad hoc combination of existing instruments
(e.g., bilateral loans), which would require only limited legal changes
and institution-building (coded 0). The Greek Loan Facility that was even-
tually established consisted of bilateral loans from euro area countries and
the IMF, coordinated by the Troika but not based on any systematic
support framework (outcome coded 0).
Figure 1. EC and ECB positions, and outcomes of 39 negotiated issues.
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Figure 1 provides a visual overview of our data by showing the negotiating
positions of the European Central Bank and the European Commission on the
39 issues under examination, along with negotiated outcomes.
Empirical model and results
To test for the presence, extent and correlates of the influence exerted by the
ECB and the EC over EMU negotiations, we begin by establishing our depen-
dent variable as the bargaining success of each member state participating in
the negotiations. Following the approach of Lundgren et al. (2019b), and con-
sistently with common practice in political economy and EU studies literature
(e.g., Arregui & Thomson, 2009; Bailer, 2004; Lundgren et al., 2019b), we oper-
ationalize bargaining success by subtracting from 100 the distance between
the initial position of a country on a given issue and the negotiated
outcome. Thus, at the two extremes, a member state whose initial position
on an issue corresponds to the negotiated outcome—and which therefore
has achieved full bargaining success—is assigned a value of 100, while a
member state for which the difference between initial position and
outcome is 100, indicating a total defeat, is given a score of 0. Our total
number of observations is 575.
For the purposes of testing our first hypothesis, we model our main inde-
pendent variables as two dummies indicating whether, on each given issue,
the initial position of the ECB (or the EC) coincides with that of the member
state under examination (in which case there is a ‘coalition’ between the
state and the technical body: value 1) or not (value 0). The intuition behind
this approach is that if we observe that being aligned with the preferences
of a technical body systematically increases a member state’s chances to
prevail in a negotiation, we would have a strong indication that the technical
body in question exerts autonomous influence over the negotiation’s
outcome. Conversely, should we find that the coalition between a state and
a technical body either decreases or has no effect on the state’s chances of
success, we would conclude against the technocratic hypothesis.
To test H2 through H4, we introduce interaction terms between the
coalition dummies and three additional variables corresponding to the
three hypotheses, and operationalized as follows:
Bargaining setting: For simplicity, in our dataset we identify only two types of
bargaining setting for each of the technical actors under examination, separ-
ating the one expected to place experts in the most advantageous position
from the rest. For the European Central Bank, we expect the most favourable
setting to be that of the Eurogroup meetings, based not only on the greater con-
sistency of this setting to the ECB’s competence reach—both subject- and mem-
bership-wise—but also, and more concretely, on the fact that the ECB president
has the right to participate in Eurogroup meetings. Of the 39 issues analysed, 9
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took place fully or primarily within the Eurogroup and required unanimity for the
decision. As for the Commission, we expect it to have relatively more influence
on issues where the main decisions are made following the ordinary legislative
procedure (OLP), which combines a monopoly over the initiation of legislation
on the part of the EC with qualified majority for decisions in the Council of Min-
isters (in addition to majority in the European Parliament), thus granting the
Commission significant agenda setting power over the issue in question
(Pollack, 1997). 12 of our 39 issues were decided on through the community
method.
Complexity:While issue complexity is a challenging variable to measure directly,
we believe that a good proxy for it is represented by the number of different
initial negotiating positions existing on any given issue. This is based on a
twofold argument: for one thing, we expect issues with more facets and impli-
cations to naturally give rise to a greater range of opinions among participants
than simpler issues. For another, the multiplicity of positions may itself become a
source of complexity, insofar as it requires negotiating parties to gain more infor-
mation about the bargaining landscape and consider the ramifications of a
greater number of possible solutions. As the number of initial positions in our
dataset ranges from one to four, we operationalize this variable dichotomously,
with simple issue having up to two different bargaining positions (26 issues) and
complex ones having three or four positions (13 issues).
Salience: Similarly to the case of complexity, we operationalize salience by proxy,
looking at the number of expressed, or in any case recognizable, negotiating
positions (as opposed to non-positions) for each issue. This operationalization
is based on the idea that more politically salient issues will generate more inter-
est and clearer bargaining positions among member state governments. On the
other hand, the less salient the topic, the greater the chances that a member
state may be less adamant about it, at the extreme even overlooking the
issue altogether by not expressing any position. The variable is modelled in
four a priori categories based on the number of member states expressing a
negotiating position on any give issue: one to seven; eight to 14; 15–21; and
22–28. The first category is empty, therefore the analysis will only include the
remaining three categories, containing seven, 16, and 16 issues respectively.
For our statistical analysis we employ a two-level hierarchical model with
random effects for issues. This model allows us to account for dependencies
among observations at group level (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Lundgren et al.,
2019a). As we regress our dependent variable ‘success’ on our independent
variables and interaction terms, we also add a battery of controls to the
model in line with previous work on (EU) negotiations, in order to account
for alternative explanations of bargaining success. Here we summarize the
most important among these controls, whereas the full list of variables and
their operationalization can be found in online appendix B. In the first
place, we control for the ‘centrality’ of a state’s negotiating position, which
has been shown to be a key explanatory factor for bargaining success by pre-
vious work conducted on similar data (Bailer, 2004; Lundgren et al., 2019b).
Centrality is measured as the absolute distance of a state’s position from
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the mean issue position held by the remaining countries. Second, we consider
a number of relational factors that may influence negotiation success, control-
ling primarily for whether the country held the rotating presidency of the
Council of Ministers, and for its network capital to measure a country’s diplo-
matic relations within the EU (Naurin, 2007). Finally, we control for a range of
countries’ characteristics that are likely to influence negotiation positions,
such as GDP (to measure economic power), euro area membership, and a
Eurosceptic public, all of which are expected to increase a state’s bargaining
power, and high budget deficits and participation in a financial aid pro-
gramme, which are likely to negatively influence negotiation success.
Online appendices C and D present, respectively, summary statistics for all
the independent and control variables, and correlations between the main
variables of interest.
The result of the ordinary least squared (OLS) regression are presented in
Table 1. As a robustness check on our results, we have also run logit
regressions, modeling our dependent variable as dichotomous rather than
continuous (0 for bargaining failure, 1 for success, with the cut-off at 50).
The results of the logit models, which are consistent with the OLS, are pre-
sented in online appendix E.
The first result that stands out in Table 1 is the consistently positive, and
statistically significant, effect of the Commission coalition variable on
member states’ bargaining success in all the seven models estimated. Being
aligned with the EC is associated with a reduction of the distance between
a country’s initial position and the negotiated outcome by roughly 27–51
points out of 100, depending on the model. This, in turn, suggests a poten-
tially strong pull effect on the part of the Commission in the negotiations
under scrutiny. Almost the exact opposite happens in the case of coalitions
with the European Central Banks, which have a statistically significant and
negative effect on member states’ bargaining success in six out of seven
models. In other words, whereas the Commission appears, overall, like a
‘winner’ in EMU negotiations, the ECB seems to be systematically on the
losing side.
Interestingly, the ECB’s bargaining weakness is confirmed, and even
amplified, in the negotiating setting that one could expect to be most favor-
able to it, i.e., the Eurogroup, where being in a coalition with the Bank corre-
lates negatively with a state’s average negotiating success by 21 points, as
opposed to the 12 points of the overall effect (model 3). The EC’s effect, on
the other hand, moves in the expected direction, increasing—albeit not by
much: from 27 to 29 points (model 2)—when interacted with the most favor-
able setting of the ordinary legislative procedure.
The complexity interaction term yields unexpected results for both the ECB
and the Commission. In the former case, and similarly to what happens for the
Eurogroup interaction term, complexity increases the negative effect of the
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Table 1. Ordinary least squares regression results.
Success
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
COM coalition 39.47*** 26.69*** 41.03*** 51.45*** 39.35*** 96.20*** 30.06***
(3.18) (4.03) (3.20) (3.58) (3.19) (8.64) (3.16)
ECB coalition −16.57*** −17.17*** −12.39*** −18.96*** −11.72*** −21.94*** 43.97***
(3.13) (3.07) (3.37) (3.07) (3.70) (3.06) (8.70)
Centrality 0.38*** 0.51*** 0.39*** 0.47*** 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.63***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
GDP −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Network Capital 3.31 3.27 2.78 3.58 3.20 3.80 1.65
(3.21) (3.13) (3.20) (3.10) (3.20) (2.99) (3.00)
Council Presidency −0.90 −3.13 −1.71 −1.84 −0.93 1.56 1.15
(6.82) (6.68) (6.79) (6.58) (6.80) (6.36) (6.35)
Issue Importance −0.04 −0.40 −0.34 0.15 −0.04
(0.67) (0.70) (0.64) (0.66) (0.66)
EuroArea 0.69 −0.41 0.06 1.01 0.23 1.39 −0.41
(3.70) (3.62) (3.69) (3.57) (3.70) (3.45) (3.45)
Aid Progr 5.67 5.06 4.94 4.36 5.65 4.28 6.04
(4.75) (4.64) (4.72) (4.58) (4.73) (4.41) (4.42)
Budget Deficit −0.01 −0.001 −0.08 −0.11 −0.02 0.05 −0.13
(0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.37) (0.37)
Spread −0.45 −0.35 −0.25 −0.61 −0.42 −0.36 −0.37
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.46) (0.46)



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(6.12)
ECBcoalition * complexity −15.08**
(6.66)
Salience (3rd category) 44.84*** 45.99***
(10.66) (11.02)
Salience (4th category) 27.64** 28.43**
(10.76) (11.09)
COMcoalition * Salience 3rd category −82.05***
(9.50)
COMcoalition * Salience 4th category −45.82***
(9.64)
ECBcoalition * Salience 3rd category −88.22***
(9.85)
ECBcoalition * Salience 4th category −49.73***
(9.48)
Constant 17.74 19.85 23.42 0.26 14.24 −14.84 −24.08**
(15.89) (16.25) (15.32) (15.91) (15.85) (11.71) (11.97)
Observations 575 575 575 575 575 575 575
Log Likelihood −2,772.36 −2,757.42 −2,764.60 −2,746.09 −2,763.37 −2,718.25 −2,718.87
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,572.72 5,544.84 5,559.20 5,524.18 5,558.74 5,470.51 5,471.75
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 5,633.69 5,610.15 5,624.52 5,593.85 5,628.41 5,544.53 5,545.77









ECB coalition term on negotiation success (model 5). The EC case is even more
notable, for here complexity reverses the effect of the overall coalition variable
(model 4). Put differently, within an overall context in which the Commission is
faring quite well bargaining-wise, the subset of complex policy issues appears
instead to be a very adverse environment for this actor.
A similar dynamic, but this time more in line with expectations, is registered
for the salience interaction term, which has a negative effect for both the
Commission and the ECB (models 6 and 7 respectively), indicating that
both actors tend to be on the losing side of negotiations on politically
salient issues. Regression coefficients are large and significant for both sal-
ience categories. As for controls, finally, they all behave as expected.
Discussion and conclusion
What do these results tell us with regard to this article’s main research ques-
tions, namely whether and to what degree recent EMU reform negotiations
have been characterized by technocracy? To the extent that our findings
can be summarized in a single answer, they lend only partial support to the
‘technocratic EU’ thesis: technicians have certainly played a role in the impor-
tant juncture examined here, but not nearly as much as one would infer based
on the most categorical assessments of the EU as a technocratic regime of the
sort presented in the introduction to this article. This is, on the whole, consist-
ent with our initial expectation that technocracy is more realistically inter-
preted as a continuum rather than an absolute phenomenon. Looking at
our results more closely reveals, however, a number of interesting findings
in the context of the current debate on EU technocracy (some of which are
likely to be relevant also regarding the EU’s responses to the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic).
The strongest evidence against the idea of the EU as a technocracy comes
from our findings on the European Central Bank. Perhaps the Union’s most
quintessentially technical institution (at least as far as its formal setup is con-
cerned), the ECB has been shown here not only to be losing systematically
when bargaining against its political principals—a result which can be seen
as the exact opposite of technocracy as it has been defined here—but also
to be unable to improve its performance in those contexts that should be
more favorable (or at least less unfavourable) to it, namely when negotiating
over more complex policy issues and/or within the restricted setting of the
Eurogroup.
These results contrast sharply with much of the recent work on the ECB,
which has described the Bank as playing a leading role in tackling the euro
crisis and its aftermath, often (arguably) going beyond the perimeter of its
price stability mandate (Schoeller, 2018; Tortola & Pansardi, 2019; Verdun,
2017). It should be clear that our findings do not deny these accounts, but
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rather add an interesting piece to the story of the ECB during the crisis,
showing that no matter how prominent its place has been in the EU’s
recent economic policy-making, when interacting horizontally and more
directly with member states, the Bank has retreated to a more submissive
relationship vis-à-vis the political sphere. This, in turn, opens a number of
important questions about the relationships that may exist between politi-
cal-technical bargaining situations of the sort examined here, and the more
traditional sequential setting that sees the ECB as the technical implementer
of a previously set political mandate, and which is the basis of most existing
analyses of the Bank during the euro crisis. In particular, future research could
explore whether dominance by political actors in the framework of horizontal
negotiations might not be a factor that encourages instances of technocracy
at the implementation stage, by providing technical bodies with an incentive
to rebel ‘through the backdoor’ (Falkner et al., 2004).
It is on the side of the European Commission that this study has foundmost
evidence of technical influence over EMU negotiations. The Commission has
proved rather influential vis-à-vis member states both in general terms, and
predictably more so in the advantageous procedural context of the ordinary
legislative procedure. These too are findings that run counter a significant
portion of recent EU scholarship, which has portrayed the EC’s role in EU
policy-making on the decline, and the Union veer towards an intergovern-
mental model over time, especially as a result of the euro crisis (e.g., Bickerton
et al., 2015; Fabbrini, 2013; Puetter, 2012. But see Bauer & Becker, 2014 and
Schimmelfennig, 2015 for dissenting takes). By showing that the Commission
has been, on average, able to affect the outcomes of negotiations located at
the core of EU crisis management, the analysis presented here casts more
than a few doubts on this intergovernmental narrative. In this respect, our
results are consistent with recent work by Lundgren et al. (2019b), who
have analysed the influence of the EC—along with the European Parliament
and the ECB—in EMU negotiations, in order to appraise the EU’s
supranationalism.
Granted, the EC’s bargaining success observed here might, in principle,
have been due to a strategic ability to place itself close to outcomes identified
as more likely to materialize (Kreppel & Oztas, 2017). This is an important
potential counterargument to our findings, which deserves careful consider-
ation. One possible way to estimate the likely outcome of a negotiation is
by looking at the average position of all member states, or a plausible combi-
nation thereof. From our initial data we have calculated three such average
positions for each of issues under scrutiny: EU28, Eurozone (EZ), and the
average position of the Eurozone’s three biggest members, namely
Germany, France and Italy (EZ3). Comparing these with the EC’s position on
the 39 issues reveals not only substantial differences between them but
also, and more importantly, the absence of any significant correlation. The
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latter, in particular, is an important initial indication of the independence of
the EC’s negotiating positions vis-à-vis the member states.4
The foregoing leaves a more ‘situational’ version of the counterargument
examined here, whereby the Commission assesses likely bargaining outcomes
on a case-by-case basis, based on the specifics of the issues under negotiation.
Testing this hypothesis would require a qualitative tracing of the Commis-
sion’s preference formation in the various EMU reform issues, which is
outside the scope and space of this article. We have, however, strong indi-
cations that such a reading of EMU negotiations could at best explain only
some of the considerable bargaining pull on the part of the Commission
which we have documented here. From a theoretical standpoint, this counter-
argument implies a somewhat inconsistent view of the EC as an institution as
weak as to have hardly any volition of its own, and yet sophisticated enough
to foresee individual bargaining outcomes. Second, and more importantly,
this counterargument runs counter to a growing body of in-depth analyses
of Eurozone crisis policy-making, which has shown the Commission to be
able to form genuinely independent preferences and achieve important
objectives in its interactions with member states. This includes work on a
number of prominent policy issues included in our dataset, such as the
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (Schön-Quinlivan & Scipioni, 2017),
the Fiscal Compact (Smeets & Beach, 2020), the European Stability Mechanism
(Smeets et al., 2019), and the banking union (Epstein & Rhodes, 2016). This
research in turn links to a broader empirical literature documenting the Com-
mission as a largely autonomous institutional actor, whose ability to influence
EU policy-making certainly varies according to circumstances, but should not
be outright dismissed even in less favorable contexts such as treaty reform
(e.g., Christiansen, 2002; Christiansen & Jørgensen, 1998; Dimitrakopoulos &
Kassim, 2005; Falkner, 2002).
We regard our findings about the Commission as only a partial confir-
mation of the technocracy thesis, for two reasons. First, and most obviously,
because of the direction and magnitude of the effect observed for the sal-
ience interaction term, which shows the influence of the Commission vanish-
ing when salient issues are under negotiation. Read together with the
remaining results, this denotes a rather compartmentalised type of power
on the part of the Commission, whose effect on bargaining outcomes is
remarkable on the whole, as discussed above, yet tends to be concentrated
disproportionally on issues that are deemed less important by the member
states. In sum, to the extent that technocracy can be said to be exercised
by the Commission, this is clearly conditional.
The second reason takes us back to the hybrid nature of the Commission,
as described earlier in the article, and to the simple observation that whatever
influence the EC has exerted over the EMU negotiations examined here, it has
done so as an institutional actor that is, at the same time, technical in certain
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respects and political in others. Needless to say, it is only to the former facet of
the Commission that our findings on the presence of technocracy in the EU
can be applied. Looking at our empirical results, one might also argue that
it is because of this hybrid nature that the Commission has not been able
to prevail in the context of complex policy issues, where we would expect a
purely technical actor to have a bargaining edge. But clearly this cannot be
more than speculation at this point.
What is more important to note here about the dual nature of the Commis-
sion is that, while its two sides are inseparable in practice, when considered
from a more theoretical point of view they have profoundly different impli-
cations, above all on the legitimacy of the Union. Political domination on
the part of a supranational technical actor is an unequivocal distortion of
the democratic principle, the redressing of which can only take place by
pushing experts back into their appropriate decision-making confines. The
influence of a supranational political player, on the other hand, does not
necessarily pose a problem of legitimacy for the Union, so long as the gap sep-
arating it from voters—what is commonly known as the democratic deficit—
can be filled satisfactorily. In light of this article’s results, it is therefore particu-
larly important to dig deeper, both analytically and empirically, into the hybrid
nature of the Commission in order to, first, unpack the various components of
each of the two facets with greater precision, and second, assess systemati-
cally if and how the balance between them has changed over time. It is
only by gauging, with more accuracy than has been done so far, whether
the Commission is on a trajectory of ‘politicization’, or conversely it is becom-
ing a more technical actor, that we will be able to establish to what extent the
type of supranational influence documented here constitutes an instance of
technocracy. This will, in turn, have important consequences on our normative
appraisal of the European Union’s political order.
Notes
1. For the sake of clarity, and coherence with the definition of technocracy adopted
here, hereafter the term ‘technician’ will be used to indicate any expert who par-
ticipates in policy-making within the formal and expected boundaries of his/her
role (that is, without having undergone the above-mentioned distortion in his/
her relationship with representative politicians, which would turn him/her into a
‘technocrat’).
2. To mention a well-known recent example, consider the recent political and legal
disputes over some of the non-standard monetary policy measures introduced
by the European Central Bank (ECB) to tackle the euro crisis and its conse-
quences, above all the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and quantitative
easing (QE). Are these measures to be considered fully within the mandate
and rights of the ECB, or should they be seen, conversely, as an unwarranted
intrusion on the part of the Bank into the Eurozone’s economic policy-making
—thus constituting a case of technocracy?
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3. For comprehensive accounts of the unfolding of the euro crisis, and the political
and institutional reactions to it, see Bastasin (2015) and Tooze (2018).
4. The mean distance between the Commission’s position and the three averages
is 39.7, 36.5, and 35.5 points respectively. Pearson coefficients between the EC
positions and those of the EU28, EZ and EZ3 member states are 0.14, 0.21,
and 0.3 respectively. See online appendix F for further details.
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